2026 forecast: what’s changing in migration, detention and alternatives

Wars and conflicts are displacing record numbers of people. From Iran to Palestine, from Ukraine to Sudan, violence has uprooted millions and will continue to drive more people to migrate in the year to come. But another spectre is looming over the world and driving people to leave their homes: climate change.

Climate-related disasters, prolonged drought and food insecurity are already displacing people from their homes and communities. The problem is that existing legal frameworks don’t properly recognise people displaced by climate change.

People fleeing drought, famine, flooding and natural disasters are not classed as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention – this means they can’t access many rights and protections. And it’s this recognition gap that leaves people displaced by climate change more exposed to human rights abuses, exploitation and immigration detention.

Climate-induced displacement is reshaping migration systems. If we treat the record numbers of people fleeing environmental crises as an isolated issue, rather than as a consequence of broader climate decisions, we risk penalising individuals without addressing the root causes.

Whether 2026 marks the start of better protection for people displaced by climate change will depend on whether governments choose to adapt migration policies to reflect this reality. Ultimately, this will require countries to work together across borders to ensure policy coherence and coordinated efforts, because a global problem needs a global response.

Another defining trend will be the expansion of ‘externalisation’ – the practice of pushing migration control beyond a country’s own borders.

Instead of handling asylum claims and protection responsibilities within their own systems, states increasingly try to prevent people from reaching their borders, process claims in other countries, or return people to third countries where their cases are handled.

In Europe, this has included funding authorities in other countries to intercept people at sea, despite well-documented human rights abuses. And in the UK, proposals were put forward – and since abandoned – to transfer people seeking asylum to Rwanda for processing, placing responsibility for protection outside the country altogether.

Across regions, governments are increasingly trying to prevent people from reaching their territory, or removing them to other countries through third-country deals, offshore processing and funding enforcement abroad.

Externalisation is politically attractive because it keeps migration somewhere else. But it also creates legal grey areas and transfers the responsibility to countries with fewer resources, weaker oversight and limited protection infrastructure. And as borders move outward, so too do detention systems.

These approaches remain deeply contested, and in many countries they are facing growing legal, political and public resistance. As new migration policies take effect – particularly in Europe, the United States and other countries in the Global North – externalisation is likely to remain central to political debate. The focus increasingly shifts from whether such arrangements are lawful in principle to how they operate in practice, and who bears the consequences.

In many countries, migration is being approached as a security problem and has been increasingly politicised. Migrants and refugees are managed as risks or threats, instead of as people looking for safety and opportunities.

Being seen as ‘tough’ on migration has become a way for governments to signal strength, even when those approaches don’t actually work in practice.

When migration and displacement are treated as a danger and migrants and refugees are scapegoated for political gain, harsher responses and an increasingly militarised approach starts to seem normal. Detention becomes easier to justify, even when it causes serious harm and does little to resolve people’s cases.

In many cases, border and enforcement agencies are being given more power, budget and visibility, while systems designed to assess claims fairly or support people in the community receive less attention. Detention is no longer being used as a last resort in some parts of the world, but as a symbol of control.

While many governments are doubling down on detention, others are moving in a much better direction. IDC has worked with governments and community groups in many countries to show that people don’t need to be locked up for migration systems to function, because non-detention approaches and alternatives to detention work. We’ve seen momentum behind these approaches in some countries and regions.

One of the key questions for 2026 is whether governments continue to aggressively push detention or whether they embrace evidence-based policies that actually work.

Technology is becoming one of the most powerful and poorly regulated tools of migration governance.

Biometric systems, data-sharing arrangements, the use of algorithms and digital monitoring are expanding in many regions. Automated tools and AI-supported decision processes are increasingly discussed as solutions to backlogs and inefficiency.

These tools are often presented as neutral, innovative or efficient. But without safeguards, surveillance-based digital tools can entrench bias, reduce transparency and make decisions harder to challenge. They can extend control beyond physical borders and into everyday life, particularly when monitoring is used as a condition of release or legal stay.

IDC has been raising concerns about how digital tools are being used to track and control migrants’ lives.

We recently published new research on ‘digital detention’ – where technology is used to monitor, surveil and restrict migrants and refugees – and we are calling for better oversight and accountability.

In 2026, we’ll be asking more questions about who controls migrants’ data, how technology is used in migration governance, what is the role of the corporate sector and whose rights are protected.

In 2026, policy will continue to follow the public narrative, and shifting that narrative will be no mean feat.

Simplified, emotive content spreads faster than evidence, particularly on social media platforms built to reward outrage and spectacle. A simple slogan – from ‘stop the boats’ to ‘build the wall’ – can reach millions in minutes, while explaining how asylum systems work or why detention is ineffective and harmful is much more complex.

This matters because public sentiment determines what feels acceptable to policymakers. When negative sentiment reaches a certain level, policies that would once have caused concern are more easily defended.

Public narratives don’t just reflect policy, they shape what becomes politically possible.

That’s why IDC works to empower public audiences to engage with this issue and make their voices heard. We also work alongside people who have experienced detention to amplify their perspective, challenge fear-based messaging and remind the public that migration policies affect real lives. IDC’s global network has helped connect these voices, creating the world’s largest movement to end immigration detention.

In 2026, narrative change will be more central than ever in efforts to end immigration detention and safeguard human rights. The stories that gain traction will help determine whether communities accept alternatives to detention, whether policymakers feel able to invest in evidence-based policies and how human rights feature in public debate.

There are still reasons to be hopeful. Alongside regressive approaches, we’re also seeing meaningful signs that different choices are possible and already taking shape.

In 2026, pressure on governments to end child immigration detention is likely to grow.

In the United States, images and reports of children being held by border authorities have sparked public outrage.

At the same time, policy changes and commitments in places like Belgium and parts of Southern Africa show growing recognition that efforts to end child immigration detention can work in practice and that locking up children causes serious and lasting harm.

This progress reflects years of work by IDC and other communities, advocates and organisations pushing for change and showing that children can be protected without being detained. Through our global and regional work to end child immigration detention, IDC has worked alongside governments, UN agencies, people with lived experience and civil society to help turn shared principles into real policy discussions.

And these commitments don’t exist in isolation. They’re beginning to influence expectations, raising the bar for what governments are expected to do. While progress remains uneven and there are also some regressions in this area, the conversation itself has been shifting. In 2026, we predict that more people will begin asking not whether child detention should end, but how and when.

2026 is also likely to bring greater interest in alternatives to detention.

Immigration detention is expensive, inhumane and ineffective – it fails as a deterrent and does nothing to speed up case resolution.

As these facts become harder to ignore, governments are being pushed to find better ways forward.

In recent years, some countries have tested approaches that allow people to live in the community while their cases are decided. These models focus on providing clear information and support, as well as access to work, education and services in the community, rather than punishment.

We expect to see more initiatives like this taking place in the year to come. IDC has worked with governments and local organisations to show how alternatives to detention can work in practice. And the use of non-detention approaches in countries like Colombia that decided to regularise instead of detaining – as well as targeted initiatives in countries such as Belgium, Mexico, Zimbabwe and Thailand – have helped evidence the real life value of alternatives to detention.

In 2026, more people are likely to ask a simple question: if alternatives work, why is detention still the default?

In 2026, we hope to see more countries working together to learn from each other and develop joint policy.

Migration does not stop at borders, and nearby countries are often facing similar challenges at the same time.

In several regions, governments have begun sharing experiences and learning from each other and also engaging constructively with civil society actors. IDC has supported these conversations, bringing countries together to talk openly about what has worked, what hasn’t and what could be done differently.

Our existing regional peer learning platform has driven unprecedented progress on curbing child detention in the Asia Pacific. And in 2026, we’ll be expanding this approach into Europe.

In the months to come, we’re hoping to see this kind of regional and inter-regional cooperation become more widespread, helping alternatives feel less risky and more realistic, including more south-to-south peer learning efforts.

Another shift that’s likely to continue in 2026 is greater focus on inclusion and migrants’ right to work.

In many countries, people are waiting months or years for decisions, and during this time, they often don’t have the right to work or support themselves. This leaves people isolated and dependent on the government for support.

Through regional engagement and policy dialogue, IDC has consistently emphasised that inclusion is not only a rights issue, but also a practical one.

Some governments are beginning to recognise depriving people of the right to work doesn’t help anyone.

In 2025, Thailand made a policy change allowing Myanmar refugees in border camps to work and support themselves, after years of advocacy by IDC, regional partners and civil society.

In 2026, we hope to see more countries embracing migrants’ right to work. As governments grapple with long backlogs and stretched systems, enabling people to work and live with dignity may increasingly be viewed as part of the solution.

Another shift likely to shape migration discussions in 2026 is the growing role of people with lived experience of immigration detention in policy and advocacy.

For many years, debates about detention and migration were largely led by governments, lawyers and policy experts. That is beginning to change. People who have experienced detention are speaking publicly, organising in their communities and contributing to policy discussions.

Lived experience leaders are challenging misinformation, sharing their perspectives and helping expose the human cost of immigration detention.

Their perspectives are also helping shape better solutions, ensuring that alternatives to detention reflect the realities people face in practice.

At the same time, many remain excluded from the spaces where decisions are made. Representation is uneven, and people directly affected by detention often struggle to be included in policy processes.

In 2026, expanding the role of lived experience leadership will remain an important part of building fairer systems. That means ensuring people affected by detention are meaningfully included in decisions that shape the policies governing their lives and communities.

2026 will not be defined by migration numbers alone, but by choices.

Detention is harmful, expensive and ineffective, and what’s more: it is unnecessary. Rights-based, community-centred approaches already exist, and they work.

The question for the year ahead is whether governments choose evidence and dignity, or the politics of division and fear.

IDC will continue working with governments, civil society, UN agencies and communities to advance alternatives to detention that are fair, effective and grounded in human rights, and to empower migrants and refugees to live normal lives and resolve their cases with dignity.

Immigration detention is not inevitable. It is a political choice. And in 2026, we can choose to do better.